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The Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") hereby submits its Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
The proper employment of disciplinary probations is unclear. The Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") identify probation as a sanction, but unlike the 
sanctions of admonition, reprimand, suspension, and disbarment, which have explicit 
criteria for their imposition, probations have no such criteria. Similarly, whereas the 
Standards identify and define as sanctions "resignation with discipline pending" and 
"reciprocal discipline," and the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") 
provide criteria for their imposition, the RLDD do not address probation. Probation is 
the only sanction for which there are no standards upon which a decision for imposing it 
may be based, beyond the exhortation in Rule 3 of the Standards, which apply in all 
disciplinary matters, that the factors to be considered in imposing a sanction are the 
duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the level of injury caused by the misconduct, 
and the presence of mitigating or aggravating factors.1 
The upshot is that neither the OPC, nor the respondents, nor the District Courts 
have guidelines for determining when probation might be appropriate. Historically, this 
did not present significant problems because probation has seldom been proposed 
either by the OPC or by respondents, and when it was proposed, the OPC only agreed 
to it in certain kinds of situations. Now, however, two cases have resulted in probation 
being imposed outside the contexts in which the OPC has considered it appropriate, 
1
 Significantly, the Rule 3 factors tie explicitly into Rule 4, which provides the framework 
for imposing the sanctions of disbarment, suspension, reprimand, and admonition, but 
not probation. 
and even has been imposed when neither party suggested it.2 The point is that the 
question appears to be arising more frequently, and deserves the Court's attention most 
importantly to ensure that like cases are treated similarly, and also to preserve the 
resources of the courts and the OPC. 
The OPC recognizes the virtues of flexibility and creativity in fashioning 
disciplinary sanctions, but these have their limits. Too much creativity and flexibility can 
produce results that either impose unreasonable burden on a respondent, or allow too 
much lenience. Either result is unfair to the individual respondents or to respondents 
who have engaged in similar misconduct, and undermines the integrity of the 
disciplinary system. This is why the OPC seeks the Court's guidance in this case and 
its companion, In re Henderson. 
The OPC's initial brief with its attached chart attempted to capture the breadth of 
how other jurisdictions handle probation. The diversity of their approaches illustrates 
the need for guidance. The Utah cases cited suggest that the Court might take a 
severe approach to an attorney's dishonesty, but because none of them are on point, 
the question remains open. 
CONCLUSION 
The OPC asks the Court to determine whether probation is an appropriate 
sanction for an attorney's dishonesty to clients and others. If it is not, the Court should 
reverse that portion of the District Court's Ruling and Order re: Sanctions, and impose 
the appropriate presumptive sanction of suspension. Although the sanction is 
2
 Probation was not imposed sua sponte in this case, but was imposed sua sponte in 
the case identified in the OPC's initial brief. See Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant, at 19-
20. 
2 
challenged in this case, the OPC asks the Court to go beyond addressing that, and to 
provide general guidelines for imposing probation. 
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